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Abstract: 
Given the ambitious, politically-driven wind energy agenda in some U.S. States (e.g., California and 
Texas) and in Europe (e.g., Germany and Spain), adequate regulatory instruments are needed that 
provide incentives for additional generation capacity and transmission expansion. This paper analyzes 
the impact of wind energy extension scenarios in 2020 on the European high voltage grid, using a 
nodal pricing mechanism and assuming expanded wind generation capacity. Our analysis is based on a 
DC Load Flow network model that is implemented in GAMS. The results show that the necessary 
network extensions mostly arise from existing congestion, particularly between countries, and that 
additional wind capacity can be integrated with relatively little effort. We conclude that the regulatory 
implications of additional feeding-in of wind energy are less critical than often asserted. 
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1 Introduction 
“Greening the grid” is an often-stated objective in the present discussion about integrating renewable 
energy into the transmission network. Renewable energies, particularly wind, are considered to 
provide significant amounts of electricity in a lower-carbon world. Given the ambitious, politically-
driven objectives for wind energy in some U.S. States, in Europe, and elsewhere, an adequate 
regulatory framework is required to provide the proper incentives for additional generation capacities 
and network expansion. Some instruments, such as uniform pricing of network access, simply do not 
provide adequate signals for investment and usage. 
At first, the issue of additional wind generation was discussed in purely political terms. Proponents 
hailed it as a clean, sustainable resource, while opponents insisted on the infeasibility of integrating 
intermittent wind into regular dispatch of electricity. However, recent experience with feeding-in large 
amounts of wind has shown that the operational issues are manageable, and the resource can be 
addressed with less ideological pathos, since regulatory decisions mandate wind’s role as a key player 
in the development of European electricity markets. Another aspect of the new debate concerns how 
additional wind capacities may be efficiently integrated. In the past, wind generation was 
decentralized and its impacts on the grid were generally quite minor. However, factoring in onshore 
and, more importantly, projected construction of offshore capacities, gives rise to questions about 
wind’s growing impacts, especially whether the existing grid is still capable of reliably securing 
energy supply in the integrated network.  
Regarding the functionality of liberalized electricity markets, the economic literature distinguishes 
primarily three issues. First, the literature on the efficient operation of the existing network analyzes 
how to set efficient electricity prices to reflect the potential scarcity of transmission capacity. It has 
become clear that realistic modeling includes coping with non-convexities which can produce 
ambiguous results. Schweppe et al. (1988) show that efficient prices differ by location and over time 
due to the network’s physical characteristics and the different demand situations. Their seminal work 
defining nodal pricing or locational marginal pricing (LMP) has since then (???) become an essential 
ingredient. Based on Hogan’s work (1992) on contract networks, LMP is used as a pricing tool for 
several types of market studies. Nodal pricing guarantees theoretically and practically the highest 
utilization of an existing grid because both generation and transmission constraints are considered 
when calculating electricity prices. Nodal pricing can be used to carry out economic analysis under 
technical grid constraints.2 In Europe, the introduction of cross-border nodal pricing is somewhat 
tardy; greater market integration requires coordination from several sovereign countries that tend to 
emphasize national interests. Accordingly, Boucher and Smeers (2002) analyze the future organization 
of cross-border trade in the European market, concluding that the economic principles proposed by the 
European Commission in 2001 are insufficient. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) analyze Regulation 
                                                     
2 Compare Green (2007) for England and Wales, Stigler and Todem (2005) for Austria, Leuthold et al. (2008a) for Germany 
and Northwest Europe. 
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1228/2003 and conclude that market integration is entirely possible, but that making allowances for 
political reasons will result in economic inefficiencies. 
The second issue is efficient transmission expansion. There is a debate about who should carry it out: a 
regulated entity (centralized transmission planning, or CTP), or the market (merchant transmission 
investment, or MTI). The objective of a standard CTP approach is to maximize (expected) social 
welfare, whereas under MTI the investor should be incentivized by positive return on investment 
(ROI). Also, the investor should participate in the effect that the investment has in the light of network 
externalities and the question how to deal with the risk that comes with a transmission investment for 
both the new investor and the existing transmission owner is still unanswered. Bushnell and Stoft 
(1996) distinguish contracts for differences (CFD) to hedge temporal price risks and transmission 
congestion contracts (TCC) that pay the owner the locational price difference between the two nodes 
specified in the contract. Bushnell and Stoft base their analysis on a contract network regime as 
proposed by Hogan (1992) and find that in this case TCCs provide the correct incentives for network 
investments. Chao and Peck (1996) use the nodal pricing methodology and design tradable 
transmission capacity rights that are able to combine a competitive market for transmission services 
and a competitive spot market for electricity. They suggest a trading rule for these transmission 
capacity rights that combine a Coasian property right approach to transmission congestion and the 
Pigouvian principle to account for network externalities. Joskow and Tirole (2000), however, 
distinguish two types of tradable rights: financial transmission rights (FTRs)3 and physical 
transmission rights. FTRs are financial instruments that entitle or oblige the holder to receive or make 
payments in case of congestion. Physical rights give the holder the right to transmit electricity even in 
congestion scenarios. The two authors find that in instances of loop flow effects physical rights can be 
withheld and thus are likely to be misused in order to exert market power. Thus, they favor FTRs 
where physical withholding is not possible.4 On the other hand, Baldick (2007) argues that border flow 
rights (BFRs) make FTRs dispensable, and states that BFRs resolve the property-rights issues for 
existing and new transmission capacity arising from new investments. Brunekreeft and Newbery 
(2006) focus on the welfare effects of a must-offer provision of line capacity in the case of MTI. They 
conclude that the regulatory instrument of a must-offer provision, has positive short-term welfare 
effects but may lead to underinvestment in network assets. They do not recommend applying must-
offer provisions. Other authors look at the risk associated with a MTI decision under uncertainty 
(Salazar et al., 2007; Saphores et al., 2004). Among the CTP approaches, Vogelsang (2001) analyzes 
transmission cost and demand functions assuming rather general properties, and adopts established 
regulatory adjustment processes based on a two-part tariff cap for transmission. Hogan et al. (2007) 
and Rosellón and Weigt (2008) extend this two-part tariff approach accounting for loop-flow 
properties of an electricity network. Sauma and Oren (2006) compare a three-period proactive network 
planning (PNP) model to a combined generation-transmission operation and investment planning as 
                                                     
3 According to Joskow and Tirole (2005), the terms TCC and FTR are interchangeable. 
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well as to a transmission-only planning model. They conclude that PNP can correct some of the 
shortcomings of the transmission- only planning and claim that it is a valuable economic assessment 
methodology. The expected social gains by the PNP methodology should be distributed to all market 
players through side payments (Sauma and Oren 2007).  
The third research issue suggests joint treatment of congestion management and investments in an 
effort to identify a market design that is consistent with the requirements of the electricity sector and 
that captures all relevant aspects (e.g. Hogan 2002; Joskow 2007). Joskow and Tirole (2005) point out 
that transmission investment is influenced by congestion management schemes and the mitigation of 
market power issues, lumpiness of transmission investment decisions, stochastic elements of 
transmission networks, and the like. Looking at the compatibility of investment signals in transmission 
and generation, Pérez-Arriaga and Olmos (2006) propose to apply a locational transmission tariff in 
addition to LMP which should serve as long-term signal. Rious et al. (2008) analyze whether a two-
part tariff is able to incorporate short- and long-run issues to manage electricity networks efficiently. 
Based on a two-node network, they find that a joint implementation of nodal pricing and an average 
participation tariff is favorable for combining generation and transmission investment. However, the 
optimal set of generation and transmission investments may not be utilized because of transmission 
lumpiness. 
To date, the research on electricity networks and renewables emphasizes technical issues relating to 
network integration and expansion. A study from the German Energy Agency (DENA 2005) that 
analyzes the costs of integrating additional wind capacity in the German grid finds that extensions to 
resolve emerging network bottlenecks would be cost-intensive. Other technical studies with similar 
results look at Poland (PSE 2003), France (Verseille 2003), the Netherlands (Hondebrink et al. 2004), 
Austria (Haidvogel 2002), Denmark (Woyte et al. 2005) and Spain (IDEA 2005).  
A characterization of the aforementioned economic literature is their focus on rather small two- or 
three-node networks. The above mentioned technical reports have a larger view. However, results 
from large-scale economic models on network investments have not yet been report to our knowledge. 
Rather than modeling two- or three-node networks, this paper considers the larger scale. We develop 
an economic model to calculate the optimal extension of electricity networks taking into account 
additional capacities of wind energy (onshore and offshore). We use the CTP approach and assume 
that a centralized network operator desires to maximize welfare under perfect competition. We suggest 
that nodal pricing is the adequate regulatory framework to facilitate the integration of wind, because it 
provides price signals and indicates potential congestion; thus, we can estimate the impact of 
additional wind energy by analyzing price situations. Strong price differences between neighboring 
nodes help to identify highly congested lines in different scenarios. A special grid-extension algorithm 
allows our model to extend the grid incrementally until an economically optimal grid status is 
identified that is capable of carrying the additional wind. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 The interaction between imperfect markets and investment decisions is also addressed by Borenstein et al. (2000) and 
Léautier (2001). 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our model based on Schweppe 
et al. (1988) and Todem and Stigler (2005). The network topology, the data set and our scenarios are 
described in Section 3. Choosing Europe as the study area is based on data availability and the 
ambitious goals for wind expansion in many European countries, such as Germany, Spain, the UK, 
and France. Section 4 presents the results of the model runs, scenario analysis and interpretation. Our 
model is able to identify the socially valuable investment locations. Interestingly, most of the 
necessary line extensions are not due to the large increase of wind energy in the next decade but are 
necessary to overcome already existing bottlenecks particularly at the country borders. Overall the 
investment amount needed to cope with increasing wind energy is low compared to the resulting 
welfare gain. Furthermore, a more equalized increase of wind capacities in the European countries can 
help to cancel out current local network problems. The paper concludes in Section 5 that the efforts to 
prepare the European grid for large amounts of wind generation capacities appear rather modest. 
 
2 Model 
2.1 Assumptions 
This paper examines the impact of wind energy on the grid for the forecasted scenarios in 2020. We 
assume that the conventional power plant fleet does not change from today to 2020 and simulate 
feeding the forecasted wind into the existing system. We also assume a feed-in guarantee for wind, 
which is the dominant scheme applied in Europe (e.g., Germany and Spain). An optimization problem 
is formulated that calculates the welfare for the electricity system regardless of country or state 
borders. We assume either a single entity managing the grid or perfect coordination between different 
entities, and neglect imperfect market functioning (i.e. a perfect competition approach).  
2.2 Optimization problem 
To calculate the scenarios we apply ELMOD, a model of the European electricity market as described 
by Leuthold et al. (2008b). The optimization for all scenarios is based on maximizing social welfare W 
that equals total consumer benefit minus the cost of generation needed to satisfy demand. Thus, 
welfare corresponds to the unweighted sum of consumer and producer surplus. We assume a liner 
inverse demand function pn(qn) for each node where pn is the nodal price at node n ε N and qn is the 
demand quantity at node n. Optimal dispatch is determined respecting physical laws and technical 
conditions, namely energy balance (equation 2), line capacity (equation 3) and maximum generation 
capacity (equation 4) constraints: 
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(1) 
energy balance constraint   (2) 
line flow constraint   (3) 
maximum generation constraint (per plant type) (4) 
We assume constant marginal costs cnt for each generation gnt at a node n depending on plant type t 
ε Τ. Additional costs, such as those arising from network operation and maintenance as well as start-
up costs and ramping conditions are not considered. Power flow Pl and transmission losses are 
obtained using the DC Load Flow network model (DCLF) described by Schweppe et al. (1988) and 
Stigler and Todem (2005). Transmission losses are included by splitting them between the start and 
end nodes of a line l as presented by Todem (2004). Hence, losses are represented within the net input 
in that defines the amount of energy that is injected or withdrawn from the network at node n. To 
account for the (N-1)-constraint, we use a transmission reliability margin of 20%; thus the Pmax of each 
line l is 80% of the full thermal limit. The reference period is one hour. Since the approach is time 
static, we calculate different scenarios to simulate changing external conditions. The optimization is 
coded in GAMS and solved on an Intel Xeon CPU E5420 (8 cores) machine with 16 GB RAM. 
2.3 Grid extension algorithm 
The objective is to estimate the amount of necessary grid extensions to cope with increasing wind 
energy inputs. We apply an algorithm that gradually extends the grid (upgrading existing lines). In a 
first step the model calculates the weighted average nodal prices for each node out of four 
representative standard load and wind generation cases (low wind and low load, low wind and high 
load, high wind and low load, high wind and high load) for each extension scenario: high load 
corresponds to the average value of the highest 33% of hourly demand in 2006 and low load to the 
average level of the remaining 67%. High wind corresponds to a wind input level of 80% of available 
installed capacities and low wind to a level of 20%. 
Next, the model identifies the most severely congested line (identifying the line between the two nodes 
with the highest price difference). This line is then extended by adding another circuit of the same kind 
at the same link, simulating a line extension in the form of adding one additional parallel line to an 
existing connection. We assume that this type of extension measure is possible on each circuit of the 
model. However, our model does not allow for more than four parallel circuits on one connection. If 
this constraint becomes binding, the line with the second highest price difference is extended and so 
on. 
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After each extension step it, the model performs a run and determines the new welfare value and the 
welfare change ∆Wit = Wit – Wit-1. We then compare the welfare change to the investment effort 
required to implement the respective grid extension. If the costs are higher than the change of welfare, 
the line is not considered for further extensions. The model stops if no welfare gain is obtained for 50 
extension steps. 
2.4 Investment costs 
We use the discounted value of the annual depreciation of the investment costs for the particular 
extension measure. The discounted annual depreciation value is calculated by multiplying the initial 
costs for the particular extension measure with the annuity factor ANF: 
( )
( ) 11
1
−+
+⋅= k
k
r
rrANF  
where r represents the weighted average capital costs (WACC) and k the given period. The WACC is 
calculated as: 
 
( )sr
TC
DCr
TC
Er DCE −⋅⎟⎠
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with E for equity, TC for total capital, rE for equity yield rate, DC for debt capital, rDC for interest on 
debt capital and s for tax rate. The rate rE is determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM): 
 
( ) ßrµrr fmfE ⋅−+=  
 
with rf for the risk-free rate of return, µm the market rate of return and ß the risk factor. We choose a 
given period (k) of 12 years, 25% equity ratio (E/TC), = 6% interest on debt capital (rDC), 40% tax rate 
(s), 3.5% risk-free rate of return (rf), 13% market rate of return (µm) and 0.9 as risk factor (β). Based 
on these assumptions, the annuity factor ANF is 11.75%. According to DENA (2005), the investment 
required to upgrade a 150kV/220kV and a 380kV is 70,000 €/km and 120,000 €/km respectively. The 
capital expenditure for upgrades to be compared with the welfare increase is calculated by multiplying 
the specific price per km with the length of the upgraded line divided by 8,760 hours. 
 
3 Data and Scenarios 
3.1 Data 
The model is based on the UCTE extra high voltage grid (UCTE 2004) of the European Union and 
Switzerland. It includes Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, 
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Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. 
The basic model consists of 2120 substations (nodes) and 3143 lines. Three voltage levels, 380kV, 
220kV and 150kV, are considered. 
To apply the DC load flow model, different line parameters are required: voltage levels, thermal 
limits, line resistances and line reactances. For each voltage level we select a reference line type, 
neglecting impacts of the wide range of different lines. For 380 kV, four cables per wire, for 220 kV, 
two cables per wire, and for 150 kV, one cable per wire are assumed and the thermal limits are derived 
accordingly (Fischer and Kießling 1989). In our model these maximal allowable power flows are 
multiplied by the number of circuits, neglecting impacts of influence between multiple circuits. Values 
for the resistances and reactances of high voltage circuits are subject to empirical experience. We 
assume average values based on Fischer and Kießling (1989). 
Generation capacities are based on VGE (2005). Eight types of conventional power plants are 
classified and each plant is assigned to one class according to the main fuel type (Table 1). Base case 
wind capacity information derives from several sources. For Germany we use a pro rata distribution 
for the nodes in each federal state based on ISET and IWET (2002). For other countries the wind 
capacity distribution is based on publicly available information, mainly from national wind energy 
associations.5 For Italy, Portugal and the new European Union member states, apart from Poland, no 
such data is available. Hence, the regional allocation of existing wind energy capacity is 
approximated, taking geographical and meteorological conditions into account. For Poland, the Polish 
Wind Energy Association (PWEA 2007) provides detailed information about the locations of the 
existing 150 MW installed wind capacity.
The node-specific generation costs are calculated on the basis of marginal costs, including fuel costs, 
but not accounting for operating and service costs. Wind power generation is assumed to have no 
marginal generation costs. Thus indirect costs of stochastic wind input causing higher balancing and 
response power costs are neglected. Pumped storage is assumed to store during night hours (from 
8 p.m. to 8 a.m.) by purchasing electricity on the stock exchange. Marginal costs of conventional plant 
types are adopted for two reference cases (see Section 3.2). 
To obtain a node-specific reference demand, we use the regional GDP (Eurostat 2005) as proxy for 
electricity demand. We assume that provinces with high economic output – and, respectively, with a 
high share in the countries’ GDP – have a high electricity demand. Consequently, the total electricity 
consumption is divided according to the GDP share. Within a province, the demand is distributed 
equally over all nodes. 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 EMD (2005), EWEA (2005), IG Windkraft (2005), Wind Service Holland (2005), and AEE (2007). 
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Table 1: Conventional power plant capacities in Europe 
Fuel Installed capacity [GW] Fuel Installed capacity [GW] 
Coal 99.2 Natural gas 49.0 
Lignite 44.2 Fuel oil 62.4 
Nuclear Power 107.3 Water 36.0 
CCGT 13.7 Pumped storage 23.3 
  Total 435.1 
Source: VGE (2005). 
 
3.2 Three Scenarios 
We consider three scenarios: Benchmark, WEO (World Energy Outlook), and WF12 (Wind Force 12). 
The Benchmark scenario uses 2006’s installed wind energy capacity according to DEWI (2006). WEO 
applies the wind extensions according to the World Energy Outlook 2006 (IEA 2006) of 114 GW. 
WF12 includes the alternative wind extension scenario according to the study WF12 (GWEC 2005).  
Although both extension studies analyze the energy developments on a global level and for different 
time horizons, it is possible to extract data for Europe. The studies use the same geographical 
sectioning, namely OECD Europe which includes the EU-15 countries as well as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. The countries of OECD Europe that are not 
included in the UCTE grid are Finland, Sweden, Norway, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, 
and the UK. Taking into account political, geographical and meteorological conditions, we assume 
that 22% of the forecasted wind energy capacities will be installed in the countries that are not in the 
UCTE grid (with a high amount being allocated to high wind resource countries, e.g., the UK and 
Scandinavia). The time horizon is not identical in both studies; WF12 projects to 2020 and WEO to 
2015 and 2030. In the latter case we assume a linear growth in order to make a linear interpolation 
possible. In 2020, GWEC (2005) forecasts 180 GW total installed wind capacities and IEA (2006) 
forecasts 114 GW total installed wind capacities under the described assumptions. Since the forecast 
studies do not give detailed regional information but our model uses accurate regional wind capacities, 
we allocate the additional capacities to federal states or similar administrative areas. Table 2 shows the 
obtained wind capacities. 
We do not consider changes in the demand or generation structure. Thus the approach is a ceteris 
paribus analysis. However, we assume two different generation costs cases with respect to the price of 
emission allowances (EUA): an average CO2-price of 20 €/EUA and a high CO2-price of 50 €/EUA. 
Since wind generation has assumed marginal costs of zero the welfare effect increases with higher 
costs for those fossil fuels that are replaced by wind input. Respectively, with higher CO2 prices we 
expect to observe a larger amount of economic feasible grid extensions. Table 3 summarizes the 
applied generation costs. 
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Table 2: Wind generation capacities in 2020 forecasts 
 Installed Wind Capacity [GW] 
Country/State Benchmark 
(by end of 2006) 
World Energy 
Outlook 
Wind Force 12 
Austria 1.0 5.2 8.0 
Belgium 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Czech Republic 0.0 3.3 5.0 
Denmark 3.1 2.6 4.0 
France 1.6 11.7 18.0 
Germany 20.6 31.3 48.0 
Hungary 0.1 6.5 10.0 
Italy 2.1 9.8 15.0 
Luxembourg 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Netherlands 1.6 3.6 6.0 
Poland 0.2 10.7 18.5 
Portugal 1.7 3.3 5.0 
Slovakia 0.0 1.3 2.0 
Slovenia 0.1 0.7 1.0 
Spain 11.6 24.1 40.0 
Switzerland 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Total 43.9 114.5 181.0 
Source: IEA (2006), GWEC (2005), EWEA (2006), own calculations. 
 
Table 3: Generation costs 
Fuel CO2 price: 
20€/EUA 
CO2 price: 
50€/EUA 
Fuel CO2 price: 
20€/EUA 
CO2 price: 
50€/EUA 
Nuclear Power 15.15 15.15 Natural Gas 67.00 83.50 
Lignite 37.14 67.14 Fuel oil 94.71 114.21 
Coal 37.54 61.54 Running water 0.00 0.00 
CCGT 42.64 53.14 Pump storage 40.00 40.00 
Source: Bafa (2008), own calculations. 
 
4 Results and Interpretation 
4.1 Price results 
First, we present the results assuming an average emission allowance price of 20 €/EUA. Given the 
modeled situation of 2006 we observe an intermediate price level in Central and Eastern Europe, low 
prices in France due to the large share of nuclear generation, and high prices in Italy and the Iberian 
Peninsula. If the grid is extended we observe a general price convergence in Europe. However, now 
the low-price regions encounter higher prices, which is particularly striking for France (Figure 1). The 
first extension scenario WEO results in lower prices in Europe compared to 2006. On average the 
projected 115 GW wind capacities have a positive effect on electricity prices. We observe the highest 
benefit in the Spanish and Portuguese markets. After the grid extension we again observe a price 
convergence within Europe, although the price level in Italy stays higher. The same is true for the 
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WF12 scenario. We observe a small further price decrease compared to the WEO case and a price 
convergence in Central Europe.  
Second, we analyze the price developments, given a high price for emission allowances of 50 €/EUA. 
Starting with the modeled situation in 2006 we observe a similar price pattern as in the 20 €/EUA 
case. However, the absolute price level is about 10 to 20 €/MWh higher, corresponding to the increase 
in generation costs. After the grid extension the prices tend towards a more common level in Europe, 
although regional differences remain. In the two wind extension scenarios the price level further 
decreases particularly in Spain and Portugal, with a reduction of about 20 €/MWh. Also in East 
Europe a significant reduction is observable (Figure 2). The extended grid results are quite similar to 
the case with the lower emission price leading to further reduced prices in southern Europe and a more 
equalized price level in central Europe. 
Given the price developments we can conclude that an increase of installed wind capacity in the years 
ahead leads to electricity price reductions as wind partially replaces conventional generation. This is of 
particular concern in Spain and Portugal where a doubling of the current installed wind capacity 
significantly reduced prices. We note that the benefits of increased wind are less striking in the 
remaining countries. However, grid expansion will not lead to a reduced price level in all European 
countries. The present situation is characterized by congestion at the borders and a market separated 
into several price zones. If increased network capacity removes some bottlenecks and brings prices 
closer together, formerly low-price regions (e.g., France) will likely encounter higher prices.  
 
Figure 1: Average prices before and after the network extension, 20 €/EUA 
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Source: Own calculations. 
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Figure 2: Average prices before and after the network extension, 50 €/EUA 
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Source: Own calculations. 
 
4.2 Comparison 
The results of the scenario runs are presented in Table 4. We observe that the extension of wind 
capacities leads to a lower average electricity price. In the case of an average emission allowance price 
the reduction is about 5 to 8 €/MWh, depending on the installed wind capacity. If we assume a higher 
emission price, the positive price impact of wind increases to 18 and 22 €/MWh. However, as already 
noted, this does not mean that each region profits from increased wind input in a similar fashion. 
One surprising outcome is that the benchmark model shows the highest amount of grid extension for 
both CO2 price scenarios. One would expect that the increased wind capacities in 2020 lead to a 
greater need for grid extensions due to an increase in the transmission volume and unintended loop 
flows. However, given the model setting, we find the opposite. The current grid conditions already 
show a high level of congestion which makes an ambitious extension schedule necessary. The increase 
in future wind generation appears to support the overall power flow pattern. This may stem from the 
fact that in 2006 wind capacity clusters in Germany, Denmark, and Spain, whereas in the two 2020 
scenarios France, Italy and Poland have significant installed wind capacity. Accordingly, the need for 
transporting wind might decrease. The model does not differentiate for wind speeds. Thus for the high 
wind input cases, wind generation is increased equally in all countries, leading to the possibility of 
counter injections (e.g., between France and Germany) reducing actual load. However, this benefit 
depends on the amount of wind capacity installed. In the WF12 scenario the total grid extension is 
similar to the benchmark case, while in the WEO scenario the amount is significantly lower. We note, 
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therefore, that the positive effect of opposing wind injections may be offset by localized problems in 
the case of the large capacity increase in the WF12 scenario. 
The welfare properties of the extensions are generally positive in all cases. Given the relatively low 
extension costs of about 500 million Euro (less than 0.5% of the total welfare) a significant welfare 
increase of more than 2.5 billion Euro per year is obtainable. Furthermore, a large fraction of this 
welfare gain is already achieved by the first extensions. In the benchmark case with 20 €/EUA, a 
welfare gain of 1 billion Euro is already achieved after 20 line extensions totalling less than 50 million 
Euro. The relatively low investment costs are a result of the model restriction to line upgrades and the 
assumption that each line can be upgraded to four circuits which may not always be feasible.  
Another remarkable outcome is that in the case of higher emission allowance prices, the grid extension 
is lower. Given the higher costs for conventional power plants we would assume that an increase of 
wind reduces the need for expensive fossil fuels and thus increases the welfare gain by wind 
integration. Altogether, the resulting prices are higher because of the more expensive fossil plants that 
in turn lead to a lower demand in the entire system given the modelled linear demand function. Thus, 
there are less extension requirements as the transmission volume decreases. The important number in 
the high CO2 price case is the welfare gain induced by grid extensions. Table 4 shows that the gain is 
higher as the price difference between the costs of wind energy and fossil production increase. 
Our approach calculates the weighted average of four representative hours. The separated observation 
of one worst-case hour with very strong wind (all wind generation capacities produce maximum 
power) may lead to collapse even with grid expansion. Because this situation will occur rarely (less 
than 2 to 4% of time on average), economic considerations tend to accept this “threat” since the 
additional investment costs are not justified. Such extreme events should be managed with technical 
measures other than line upgrades, such as active wind farm management, extensive grid monitoring, 
etc. 
 
Table 4: Results overview 
CO2 price: 20€/EUA 50€/EUA 
Scenario Bench mark 
WEO WF12 Bench 
mark 
WEO WF12 
Wind capacity [GW] 43.9 114.5 181.0 43.9 114.5 181.0 
Upgraded circuits 159 139 138 124 100 116 
Total length [km] 6220 5330 6440 5200 4500 5300 
Additional line 
capacity [GW] 143 106 114 102 85 92 
Total costs [mn €] 580 475 560 460 400 445 
Average price 
[€/MWh] 40.1 34.6 32.7 65.2 47.0 43.4 
Welfare [bn €/a] 230 238 242 218 229 235 
Welfare gain due to 
extension [bn €/a] 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.9 3.2 3.9 
Source: Own calculations. 
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5 Conclusion 
From the perspective of economics, this paper shows that efforts to prepare Europe’s high voltage grid 
for large amounts of wind generation appear to be rather modest. Developing the network at existing 
bottlenecks – mainly cross-border connections –should be encouraged by regulatory authorities. With 
a more moderate wind expansion of 114.5 GW, the optimal grid investments are smaller. However, if 
the additional wind capacity becomes too great (181 GW), the needed grid extensions will increase 
compared to the actual situation. “Greening the grid”, i.e. enabling the integration of low-carbon 
technologies, appears feasible for wind energy. Further research should address issues of stochasticity, 
and apply similar analysis to other renewables, e.g., solarthermal and photovoltaic. A study of the 
transferability between Europe and U.S. experiences also appears fruitful. We suggest that other 
research might examine the relationship between fostering renewable energy production and the 
design of efficient contract networks, e.g., resolving issues of priority network access for renewables 
and transmission rights. 
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